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3THE ROLE OF THE MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE IN SYSTEM
RELIABILITY1
Jens Rasmussen
Abstract: The use of probabilistic reliability evaluation of industrial process
plants is discussed. In this application low probability events leading to severe
consequences have to be identified and included in the analysis. Human mal-
functions in abnormal tasks are an important factor in such events, but human
behaviour in higher level mental tasks cannot yet be predicted. It is therefore
important to verify the limits of use of existing methods of reliability prediction.
INTRODUCTION
The definition of the reliability of a system or system component is generally
stated in terms of the probability of specified function versus time, such as:
"Reliability is defined as that characteristic of an item expressed by the
probability that it will perform its required function in the desired manner
under all relevant conditions and on the occasion or during the time inter-
vals when it is required so to perform" (Green and Bourne 1972).
This definition has its root in the vast efforts of the last two decades to de-
velop means and methods to analyse and predict the behaviour of complex
electronic systems, such as military communication and weapons systems.
This origin of vital reliability problems and the research work involved have
caused the reliability definitions and mathematical models to be tightly mis-
sion oriented, as they are mainly dealing with the probability of success.
Probabilistic models of the reliability of electronic systems have long
proved very powerful tools in the design and assessment of such systems,
and applied mathematicians have been very active developing more and
more sophisticated and elaborate models.
The success of the methods in the field of electronic systems has during
recent years led to rapidly increasing efforts to use probabilistic methods to
evaluate system performance in other technical fields.
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIAL PROCESS PLANTS
Within the design of industrial process plants, such as power stations and
chemical plants, the rapid technological progress is followed by increasing
difficulties in using "proven technology" in the traditional sense. Further-
more the rapidly increasing size of production units leads to more drastic
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4consequences of faults in terms of production losses and damage to the
plant. Consequently there is a great need to prove the technology of a pro-
posed design by a systematic prediction of-system performance. The es-
tablished probability models and methods may also be powerful tools in the
design of electric or mechanical equipment for an industrial plant, but this
application generally leads to several complications
especially if the reliability or the safely of a total plant
are considered.
In the evaluation of such systems, one often feels
like acting as the British gentleman carrying a cup of
tea so careful that he overlooks the dog on the floor.
Or, as Ralph Evans puts it in a recent editorial in
IEEE Transactions on Reliability: looking for the
purse under the street lamp, not because it was lost
there, but because that is where you can see. The
aim of the present paper is to support a discussion of
identifying areas for which the elaborate probability
methods must be extended and modified, and sup-
plemented by systematic look-out for dogs on the
floor.
So far, we have found complications in two general
aspect in the application of probability methods for
industrial process plant equipment,
First, the reliability of process plant equipment
cannot be measured simply by the probability of
required function. The analysis should be able to
relate the probability of different types of faults to
their consequences to the system. Secondly, the
relevance of the analysis is highly dependent
upon a proper coverage of the human functions
in the system.
THE PROBABILITY/SEVERITY RELATIONSHIP
Presumably most researchers advocating the use
of probability methods in systems design have been involved in discussions
with industrial people and faced with o complicated case story and whether
it would be covered by the methods and most probably it would not. The
problem is a fundamental one. The general focus of the reliability methods
upon figures related to the probability of specified functions allows a rather
isolated treatment of subsystems and system parts. The methods are there-
fore a valuable tool for the designers' judgements of the relative merit of dif-
ferent alternative solutions, and the reliability figures characterising individ-
Reliability analysis takes care of
the tea -
Accident analysis must take care of
the environment (Drawings by H. Langmaak)
5ual system parts can usually be combined to a measure of the total system
reliability.
The reliability engineer is usually happy if the result of his analysis can be
verified as a successful prediction of the gross reliability figures such as fail-
ure rate or availability.
The user of the completed system on the other hand will judge the perfor-
mance from the total cost resulting from faults in terms of loss of production
or damage to plant or injuries to staff. To some extent he may consider the
multitude of simple trivial faults as annoying, but nevertheless as the source
of part of the normal task of the staff. His attention is focused upon the fault
conditions leading to considerable risk of losses.
This complicates the analysis. It is not possible to calculate the reliability
of the parts and subsystems individually and afterwards combine the results
to find the characteristics of the total system as is done when the probability
of required function is calculated, The fault modes and figures to he used for
the individual parts have to be identified by a cause-consequence analysis of
the total system relating the possible modes of failure of the individual com-
ponents to the ultimate consequence for the system. Special attention
should be paid to the fault mechanisms, which may lead to severe conse-
quences.
In a well balanced design the prob-
ability of an abnormal event can be as-
sumed to be inversely proportional to
the related consequence to the system
operation. This is in agreement with
the frequency/severity  plot of injuries
in American industry shown by John-
son (1972) and is also reflected in the
nuclear safety criterion suggested by
Farmer (1972). The great importance of
low probability events imposing severe
risks on the system has to be faced, if
reliability prediction should be of any
real value in the design and evaluation
of industrial plants. In the safety as-
sessment of nuclear plants, for instance, the look-out is for failure probabil-
ity in the range 10-5 to 10-7 per year or less.
Neither the functional analysis of the system to identify the relevant
causes and consequences of faults nor the probability analysis itself can
cover all possible events. The analysis must be based upon a number of as-
sumptions and approximations, and there is a danger that important, but
low probability, fault modes are excluded from the analysis. It should there-
fore be realised that a quantitative reliability figure only constitutes a minor
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6part of the result from the analysis. A very significant part of the result is
given implicitly in the assumptions and approximations. as they very often
identifies conditions which may be of low probability but vital to the total re-
liability. Furthermore, they typically involve conditions, which are dealt with
by the plant personnel, and it is therefore important that the assumptions
and approximations underlying the analysis are interpreted and documented
carefully to facilitate their verifications during plant operation.
THE CAUSE /CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
The first important step of the analysis of a process system is a
cause/consequence evaluation aiming at an identification of the relevant
fault traces through the system. A fault tree analysis based upon typical
component faults may not identify low probability, but risky fault traces. A
vital part of the analysis will be to trace also the possible but improbable
faults and combinations of faults, from a postulated set of consequences.
This in itself implies an interface problem between the system and the ana-
lyst, as it demands a detailed knowledge of the
practical layout of the technical system and of
the working conditions and behaviour of the
plant personnel.
The prime condition to be fulfilled by a reli-
able analysis is of course that all relevant traces
are identified. In a complex system the analysis
cannot cover all physically possible faults and
their combinations, and it is therefore important
to have systematic heuristic methods to identify
relevant traces. Such a method should support
the creative or inventive powers of the analyst,
and we have briefly considered the "morphologi-
cal" method suggested by Zwicky (1967), which
may be a fruitful approach.
Johnson (1972) has recently published a com-
prehensive work on systematic evaluation of ac-
cidents using a similar approach. Johnson traces the possible causes start-
ing from a rather high level of abstraction and controlling the tracing of
faults systematically though several levels of detail, such as:
-"an accident is
-an unwanted transfer of energy,
-because of lack of barriers and/or controls,
-producing injury to persons, property or process
Event
Event
Event Event
Event
Event
Event Event
Event
Event Event
Event
Event
Yes No
Critical Event
Yes No
Terminated
Control
effektive?
Control
effektive?
Event
Event
Terminated
Toward
accident
The structure of a
cause/consequence analysis
7-preceded by sequences of planning and operational errors which failed
to adjust to changes in physical or human factors, and produced
unsafe conditions and/or unsafe acts,
-arising out of the risk in an activity,
-and interrupting or degrading the activity."
We find it very important to develop systematic methods for cause / con-
sequence tracing with tight coupling to appropriate models to facilitate the
complete analysis (Nielsen 1971).
A clear systematic approach to the identification of relevant fault traces
furthermore facilitates adequate documentation of the analysed mechanisms
considerably. This documentation is a vital part of the man-machine inter-
face. A trivial, but important condition of a reliable analysis is of course that
it deals with the system actually operating. The system, however, may be
subject to changes. Equipment can be modified and improved according to
operational experience, as well as working procedures and instructions will
be changed-planned or unnoticed. A considerable risk therefore exists that
the conditions of plant reliability will be unintentionally violated. To avoid
this the analysis must be documented in a systematic form, which can be
readily interpreted and used by the operational staff.
THE HUMAN FACTOR IN SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Our attention was directed towards the human element in the system by a
review (Rasmussen 68) of reported major incidents and accidents. Its pur-
pose was to enable us to judge whether our methods for reliability evalua-
tion also included such cases and we found they did not.
Among the cases reviewed are 30 cases reported in USAEC Nuclear Safety
Bulletin. In 70 80% of these cages, the incidents were initiated from human
mal-operation in the system. Furthermore, the mal-operations did not take
place during normal tasks, but overwhelmingly during abnormal or special
tasks under abnormal plant conditions, such as modifications, repairs or
cleaning and calibration operations; typically operations which are difficult
to predict and analyse, and therefore normally covered by suitable assump-
tions in the analysis.
This is quite reasonable from the traditional reliability point of view, as
this type of faults normally account for a small fraction of the total number.
In a British fault record 8,000 cases from nuclear installations including
trivial technical and human faults, the human faults amount to only 10% of
the total (Ablitt 1969). But in our context it is most unfortunate that the
source of severe incidents is very likely found in a class of faults, which are
normally excluded from the analysis by proper assumptions. A few examples
will illustrate this point of view.
8The reliability of a system very often depends heavily upon an assumption
of mutual independence of fault mechanisms Physical sources of common
mode faults such as flooding by water, rupture by missiles or trucks, etc.,
may be identified by a morphological search. But coupling due to people
moving around in the plant? If an abnormal condition in the plant, for in-
stance due to a technical fault in a subsystem, calls for manual intervention,
there is a probability that an operator misinterprets the situation and ma-
nipulates another part of the system. The result is a coincidence of two
faults, which are physically independent and as such difficult to predict at
an office desk, although it may be likely to happen, judged from the actual
working conditions. The problem is that although it may be possible to pre-
dict the probability of operator failure to execute the required function, it
may be almost impossible to predict what he does instead.
In redundant systems the assumption of independence can lead to ex-
treme reliability figures but the actual figure may likely be controlled by the
probability of a faulty repair which is repeated in more units.
Probability modelling of a complex system is often simplified substantially
if proper function of equipment is assumed verified at certain intervals and
after repair. This assumption is vulnerable and sometimes unrealistic, partly
because repair and test in itself can be faulty, but also due to technical dif-
ficulties in testing the equipment without putting it into operation. Further-
more, pressure of work during plant shut down can be great to regain plant
operation in due time to avoid the operational consequences from process
cool down or processes like xenon poison in nuclear plants. Therefore, test
and calibration procedures may be postponed to the restart phase. This may
be critical, as faults introduced during repair and modification work may
leave the plant in an abnormal state, which is not covered by the protection
of the normal safety system. Although such periods are normally relatively
short, they can in our experience contribute significantly to the total risk of
the plant.
In other words, in evaluating the reliability of a system like process plants,
the role of the human functions in the system should be considered not only
to include primary human functions in the reliability analysis itself, but also
to verify the assumptions of the analysis, as the assumptions are ultimately
administered by plant personnel.
PREDICTION OF HUMAN RELIABILITY
Several important approaches have been made towards the development of
methods for predicting human reliability. Such methods have recently been
reviewed by Meister (1972) and are the subject of other lectures of this
meeting.
The basic assumptions of these methods are typically:
9- The task is well defined and the procedure followed can formulated in de-
tail,
- The procedure can be broken down into a sequence of behavioural units,
i.e. subtasks or task elements,
- Data on the reliability of the individual subtasks are available together
with the parameters characterising the relevant task situations.
Typically these assumptions do not fit the work procedures found in process
plant environments. The work procedures may be known in detail under
task conditions, where the physical environment paces the man, and thus
forces him to use a known sequence of subtasks, as is the case in e. g.
manual assembly processes.
In modern automated process plants, however, the human function is
typically higher level mental data processing and decision making, and the
human work procedures are constrained by the physical environment to a
much lesser degree.
Consequently, the normal practice is to try to control the work procedure
in critical tasks by work instructions which take into account the possible
deviation from normal working condition that have been identified during
system design.
However, in the analysis of accidents it is frequently seen that such safe
work procedures have been operationally "improve" to fit the normal work
situation in a way that does not take account of the predicted risk.
In reliability assessment this tendency has to be faced in a realistic way.
As long as the prime cause to have the people in the plant is the human
ability to adapt to the operational needs of the plant and to improvise in all
plant conditions not foreseen by the system designer, it is not reasonable to
expect them to follow work procedures which are troublesome in the normal
work, just for the sake of conditions they possibly never meet.
The concluding remarks in reports investigating accidents, which are due
to inappropriate procedures, frequently prescribe "tighter administrative
control" of work instructions, A more realistic approach is the situational
one, as advocated by Rigby and Swain, who argue that a work situation can
only be reliable if properly fitted to normal variability of human behaviour.
Human actions due to normal psychological mechanisms should not be
classified as operator errors, even if they do lead to system faults. Rather the
work situations have not been designed in a way resulting in predictable
procedures.
Unfortunately, very few studies have been made to describe the proce-
dures evolving in higher level mental tasks in real life working conditions
and to relate them to controlling factors in the work situation. Consequently
we have recently initiated such studies. We have examined mental proce-
dures in control room environment and in an electronic work shop, and the
1
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preliminary analysis has identified features which we find illustrating in the
present discussion.
We have found that the creativity and adaptability of man often result in
the evolution of several basically different mental procedures for the same
type of task, all capable of ending up with the same result. The procedures
may differ in several basic aspects. such as the amount of data or observa-
tions which are needed; the complexity of the mental data processing which
is implied; the depth of functional knowledge regarding the system anatomy
and function which is used; and finally the time spent the task (Rasmussen
and Jensen 1973). A fault in an electronic system, for instance, may be lo-
cated from a minimum number observations if a careful deduction is used,
based upon a detail knowledge of system anatomy and internal functioning.
However the fault may also be located by a rapid sequence of observations or
measurements and simple checks against normal values in a diagram with-
out considering the functioning of the system. In this way different proce-
dures can be available to a human operator for a specific type of task, proce-
dures which fit the different working conditions in which the task is met.
The choice between the different procedures depends upon the perfor-
mance criteria adopted by the man in the actual working situation. The
rapid stream of simple decisions may be valued in some cases, due to the
low cognitive strain implied, in other cases the complex reasoning may be
chosen due to informational economy. The important point is that the per-
formance criterion of the designer and the real life operator most probable:
are different, and the designer very likely will not predict the actual proce-
dures used by trained personnel, unless he is very familiar with the actual
task conditions from studies on site.
A further prerequisite to be able to use the classical reliability methods for
evaluation of human behaviour is the break down of the procedures used
into a sequence of typical and generally used units. This can be done for a
task in which the element of the sequence on the work steps are defined and
cued by the environment as for manual tasks in production. But again it is
not the case for higher level data processing tasks in plant environments.
Newell and Simon (1958) have argued that mental processes underlying
human data processing and decision making can be decomposed into a se-
quence of elementary units, and as such simulated by a digital computer
program. But in our experience this is not the whole truth, and Dreyfus
(1965) has criticised the assumption and stressed the role of holistic, intu-
itive processing, which cannot be decomposed into elementary units. Dis-
cussing the decisions of chess playing, he argues: playing chess
. . . may involve noticing that 'here something interesting seems to be going
on', 'he looks weak over here' etc. Only after the player has zeroed in on an
area does he begin to count out, to test, what can be done from there.-
In other words the first, important step in the mental work sequence, the
identification of the task situation and the appropriate goal, may be based
1
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upon holistic process, pattern recognition, intuition and "feelings", and
based hereupon a sequential processing may take place.
From our reviews of reported accidents we have found the identification of
the proper task in abnormal plant conditions to be very critical, and our
conclusions from preliminary analysis in control room environments tend to
support the view of Dreyfus.
The operator seems to have a "process feeling", some sort of internal dy-
namic model of the environment, which all the time keeps him prepared for
the normal tasks to come. This means .that he may only be prepared to look
for very little information the actual time of a task, and it is not possible to
predict whether the information actually underlying his decisions is properly
updated. Furthermore the source of information chosen may be convenient
sources during the normal working condition, such as noise from the sys-
tem, e. g., relay clicks, rather than in-
formation planned by the designer to
be task defining and therefore dis-
played to the operator and considered
in a prediction.
Fundamentally this effect of the
"process-feeling" links the elements of a
task sequence together and they can-
not be treated individually. A control
room operator typically does not per-
form isolated actions on well specified
bits of information, he is an integrated
part of a dynamic situation. This
causes difficulties which are hard to
predict when abnormal plant condi-
tions suddenly demand the operator to
switch to other tasks and performance
criteria. The reactions to abnormal plant conditions an only be treated in the
light of the normal working conditions prior to the event and setting the pro-
cess-feeling and thus the expectations of the operator. The reactions can
only be treated in isolation, if the man-machine interface can be designed to
break the routines of the operator and to set the initial conditions of his data
processing in a predictable way at the start of a task.
It is worth noting that the basic aspects of the procedures adopted by man
for a task normally will depend upon the frequency of the task. The very fre-
quent tasks are met by procedures based upon pattern recognition and
trained, partly subconscious routines; less frequent tasks by procedures
based upon plans or instructions whereas the unique, very infrequent task
may call for improvisation and complex, deductive reasoning related to un-
derstanding plant anatomy and functioning.
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Again the frequency/risk relationship intrudes our problem. In a reason-
ably well designed system an inverse relationship can be expected between
the frequency of an event calling for manual intervention and the risk im-
plied in the event, and again the frequent events are easier to predict and
analyse, whereas the infrequent, but critical events are of major importance
to the system user. As discussed above, the familiar tasks set the stage for
the unexpected, new events and consequently the operator tends to ap-
proach a new task by the most probable hypothesis, although most safety
regulations tend to force the man to consider first the hypothesis covering
the most critical cause.
To see how far we can get in planning a man-machine interface that will
cause personnel to adopt predictable procedures it is very important to have
methods for prediction of human reliability verified by field tests and to have
a clear identification of the characteristics of those work procedures and
working situations they can be used to analyse, and to have more studies to
identify the procedures evolving during process plant operation under differ-
ent typical working conditions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The methods of probabilistic reliability evaluation today are efficient tools
internally in the design offices for process plant equipment. To reach the
state, where the methods can be used to a quantitative evaluation of the re-
liability of a complete operating process plant and an assessment of plant
safety, it is imperative to create a closer relation to the realities of process
plant operation. This implies an interdisciplinary cooperation between the
fields of reliability engineering, human factors engineering and plant opera-
tion, and a careful verification of the methods including an explicit state-
ment of the limits of their appropriate use.
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